Economists are not known for making bold predictions or giving unconditionaladvice.Thisprofessionaltraitwasstrikinglyexpressed byPresidentHarryTruman,whenhefamouslysaid:"Iwasinsearch of a one-armed economist, so that the guy could never make a statementandthensay"Ontheotherhand"". i
Yet,theeconomists'discussionoftheeuroseemstobetheexception to this saying. Right from the start, and coming mostly from AngloSaxon economists, there was no dearth of predictions that the euro would fail. The most extreme predicted a failure so dismal, that it might even provoke a war among European states. ii The contrast between these views and those held by European economists, especiallythoseassociatedwiththeEuropeanCommission,seemsto rathervindicateGeorgeBernardShaw'saphorism:"Ifalleconomists werelaidendtoend,theywouldnotreachaconclusion". iii Today, regarding the euro, there is further evidence that not only George Bernard Shaw seems to be right but also Harry Truman wouldhavenoproblemfindingone-armedeconomists.Evenamong European economists, there are diverging views and predictions. A recent example of disputing economists offering different bold predictions, is that of the well-known professors Wyplosz and Neumann.
Professor Charles Wyplosz addressed an open letter last November to the head of the Bundesbank, Dr. Jens Weidmann. iv In this, he asserts that "the debt crisis will not come to an end until the ECB intervenesaslenderoflastresort".IftheECBrefusestointervene,as Dr.Weidmannwouldhaveit,thentheeurozonewillbreakup.
Professor Manfred Neumann, on the other hand (if such an expressionisnotoffensiveinadiscussionofone-armedeconomists), totally disagrees. In a recent conference, v he sided fully with Dr. Weidmann(whowashisdoctoralstudent)ontheneedlessnessand indeed undesirability of ECB intervention. Moreover, he made the boldpredictionthatGreecewouldbeoutoftheeurozonebytheend of2012.
These divergent views and predictions are clearly based on differences in the diagnosis of the urgent problem facing the Europeaneconomytoday.Itisthereforeessentialtobrieflyexamine this,soastoclarifythenatureofwhathascometobeknownasthe eurocrisis.
1)Whatistheeurocrisis?
In the first instance, it is the inability of three European states participatingintheeurozone,GreecetostartwithandthenIreland and Portugal, to finance their debt. The inability of these states to borrow in order to meet their obligations might prove contagious andcouldthreatenanumberofothercountrieswithahighratioof debttoGDP.Thisisbecausethepotentialdefaultofamemberofthe euro zone heightens the perception of risk for other member countries, thus raising their costs of borrowing and pushing them alsotowardsdefault.
Moreover, an aggravating factor is that the whole euro zone's banking and financial system is fragile and, following the American subprime debacle, it is widely perceived to be in a weak condition. Thedifficultiesinfinancingthesovereigndebtofthethreecountries above clearly weaken it further, since banks across the euro zone holdsovereigndebtissuedbythethreeperipheralcountries.
To the extent that the state in other European countries might be obligedtostepinandstrengthenitsownbankingsystem,theriskof thatstate'sdefaultingincreases.Thisincreasesitscostofborrowing, which further increases the risk of default. This vicious circle of increasingriskperceptionconvergestoacostofborrowingthatmay behighenoughtoactuallymakedefaultinevitable.So,whatinitially surfacedasaGreekdebtcrisisrisksengulfingmanyothercountries, mostimportantlyItaly,SpainandBelgium,thusbecomingacrisisof theeuro.Ifthisisnotresolved,theexistenceoftheeurozone,atleast initspresentform,willbeendangered.
2)Whattriggeredthecrisis?
As George Soros has pointed out, "the euro crisis is a direct consequence of the crash of 2008", when Lehman Brothers was allowedtofailandtheglobalfinancialsystemstartedtocollapse.The European finance ministers correctly responded to this threat by guaranteeing, in November 2008, that no other financial institution ofsystemicimportancewouldbeallowedtofail.
"AngelaMerkelthendeclaredthattheguaranteeshouldbeexercised by each European state individually, not by the European Union or the euro zone acting as a whole. This sowed the seeds of the euro crisis because it revealed and activated a hidden weakness in the construction of the euro: the lack of a common treasury. The crisis itselferuptedmorethanayearlater,in2010". vi Mrs.Merkel'sdeclarationensuredthatthemarkets'attentionwould beconcentratedonwhethereachindividualcountry'spublicfinances could support its own banking system. After this, it was inevitable thattheeconomicallyweakestcountrieswiththeleasthealthypublic finances would sooner or later come under attack. Greece was the first, mainly because of its boundless political strife and the inexcusablefalsificationofnationalstatisticsforpoliticaladvantage.
3)Whatistherootofthecrisis?
Herewereachtherootofthepresentcrisis.Itisnowclearthatthe absenceofacommontreasuryrenderedtheconstructionoftheeuro deficientfromthestart.
Was this not realized at the time? It seems not. It was believed that theconditionsoftheMaastrichtTreatystipulating,that1)thedebtto GDPratioshouldnotexceed60%ofGDPand2)thereshouldnotbe budgetdeficitsover3%ofGDP,wereenoughtoensureavoidanceof excessivedebt.
Theaboveruleswere,ofcourse,breachedrightfromthestart.Italy, BelgiumandGreecejoinedtheeurozonewithdebttoGDPratiosfar above60%,onpromisethattheseratioswouldtendinthefutureto converge towards the 60% threshold. Moreover, France and Germanyhavebreachedthe3%budgetdeficitruleinordertoavoid recession at least 6 times each, with the total number of breaches reaching30. vii Unfortunately,theofficialthinkinghasalwaysbeenthatthereisnot any serious weakness in the euro construction other than the poor implementation of these rules. viii The December 2011 European Summit established a new legally enforceable "fiscal compact", with the European Commission approving national budgets in advance. Governmentbudgetsmustbebalancedorinsurplus,withtheannual structural deficit not to exceed 0.5% of GDP, and highly indebted countries must reduce the debt in excess of 60% by 1/20 th on averageannually.
Leaving aside the wisdom and enforceability of an arrangement, ix whichdeprivesgovernmentsoftheirmostpotentanti-cyclicaltoolby effectively making Keynesianism illegal, could this be a credible response to the euro crisis? Is the crisis solely due to excessive government borrowing? Or is it, as Soros claims, the absence of a commontreasuryandtheGermaninsistenceonanationalistrather thanEuropeanapproachtothethreatofafinancialmeltdownthatis attheoriginofthecrisis?
IfonefocusesontheGreekandPortuguesecases,theofficialthinking might seem credible. But it is clearly given the lie by the case of Ireland. There is no question that Ireland was a model of fiscal rectitude.ThemainreasonthattheIrishgovernmenthadtoborrow heavilywasinordertosaveitsbanks.IfMerkelhadnotruledouta European guarantee for the banking system, the Irish banks would nothavecomeunderattackandtheIrishsovereigndebt(whichwas justat25%ofGDPin2007)wouldbeperfectlysatisfactory.(Itmay benotedthatMoody'srateditAaauntil2007andAa2untiltheend of 2010. This is more than two years after the government was obligedtoguarantee,withoutanyEuropeansupport,thesafetyofthe over-extendedIrishbanks).
Similarly, Spain had a debt of about 30% in 2007 and its debt ratio was even in the beginning of 2010 less than that of Britain, France andGermany.Butitsfragilebankingsystem,incombinationwiththe bursting of a real estate bubble, put its sovereign debt under great pressurefollowingthedebtcrisisofGreece,IrelandandPortugal.
Consequently,itisdifficulttoacceptthattheeurozone'sproblemis excessivesovereigndebt.Thisofficialdiagnosismissestherootofthe crisis, which is to be found in the unfinished construction of the euro. As a result, the remedy proposed is not only likely to be ineffective butrisksdamagingthehealthoftheeurozonebotheconomically,by deepening the recession, and politically, by undermining solidarity and feeding chauvinist attitudes. It may thus, inadvertently lead to thebreakupandunravelingoftheeurozone.
Theappropriateremedybasedonthecorrectdiagnosisshouldbeto complete the construction of the euro by creating a common treasury. This would be in accordance with Jean Monnet's x "theorie d'engrenage",whichhasguidedthebuildingofEuropefromthevery beginning. This theory is based on the idea that a federal United States of Europe is desirable and, given that this is not at any time feasible politically in one step, a succession of steps of unequal amplitudewillberequiredovertime.Thetheorypostulatesthatany one step will lead to an unfinished construction but, through its unfinishednature,itwillcreateforcespushingforwardtowardsthe further building and eventual construction of a federal European state.Thenameofthetheory(engrenage)evokesananalogywitha complex clockwork-type mechanism made up of numerous cogwheelsofvaryingsize,inwhichanycogmovementistransmitted tothewholemechanismpushingforwardtheothercogwheels.
4)Whataremainlessonsofthecrisis?
The euro crisis has recently abated but Europe's problems are still notover.Therearecertainmistakesandomissionsofpolicy-making, which seem clear by now. What are the main lessons that can be drawnand,ifheeded,mayhelpinimprovingeconomicpolicyinthe future?
The most obvious ones have been clearly presented by Lawrence Summers (former US Treasury Secretary, Harvard Professor and former President of Harvard University). xi I summarize them briefly below, before proceeding to discuss at length a less evident one, whichhasreceivedlittleattentionbyeconomists. 1)Timidactions,whichdonotpatentlyexceedtheminimumnecessary toachievestability,arelikelytofail.Thisisespeciallythecase,ifthey areaccompaniedbydubiousassertionsandannouncementsofvague programs.ThereluctancetoassistGreeceatthestart,thesubsequent about-facewithaninadequatefirstMemorandumandinitialPSI,the underfunding of the EFSF and the ESM are relevant examples. Europe's half-hearted attempts to resolve the crisis, clearly demonstrate that "attempts to purchase solutions on the cheap are morelikelytoexacerbateproblemsthantoresolvethem".
2) Sovereign debt crises, if not actually caused by slow growth, certainly become worse by lack of growth and deflation. As shown amplyinthepresentcrisis,theefficacyofausteritymeasuresisoften overestimatedbyneglectingtheadverseeffectsongrowthandhence on tax receipts. The deterioration in the business climate and the consumers' confidence, which the austerity measures bring about, contributestothisandcausesaslowingdownoftheeconomy,even when the austerity measures are not fully implemented (as seen in theGreekcase).
It is worth mentioning that the IMF has announced at its October 2012 annual meeting in Tokyo, that fiscal multipliers have been greaterthannormalinthisrecession.Negativemultipliershavebeen intherangeof0.9to1.7,insteadofthestandardassumptionof0.5. This is because, with interest rates near zero and credit strongly constrained, the private sector did not compensate for the budget deficitreductionbyexpandingprivateinvestmentandconsumption.
3) Containing systemic financial risk through fiscal contraction is not enough to restore growth. Fiscal contraction may be necessary in order to reduce debt and eliminate systemic financial risk, so that future growth is based on a healthier and firmer foundation, but it cannot be expected to initiate or encourage expansion of economic activity. The historical examples of expansionary fiscal contraction werebasedonthepossibilityofdevaluationandstrongdemandfor exports.BothoftheseconditionsareabsentinGreeceandtheother peripheral European economies, which are presently subjected to austerityprograms.
5)Whatisthelessevidentlesson?
Let us now move on to our final lesson from the recent handling of thecrisis.Thislessonislessevidentineconomicwritingbecauseof the strong tendency (one could even say, professional deformation) of economists to assume that economic agents are fully rational. Despite the evidence garnered by psychologists and behavioral economistsinthelastfewdecades,whichconvincinglydemonstrates thedoubtfulvalidityofthisassumption,economistsfinditdifficultto admittheimportanceofnon-rationalbehavior. On Sept.16, 2011, US Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, was invited to give a speech at a meeting of the euro zone finance ministers in Wroclaw, Poland. Geithner warned of "catastrophic risks" if the seventeen eurozone countries did not act decisively to resolve the sovereign debt crisis. Though he did not propose any particularplanoraction,heurgedEuropetoprovideitsbailoutfund with more firepower, in order to send a strong and convincing message to the markets. For this, he pointed out, it is also essential that governments and the central bank speak with one voice and thereisno"loosetalkaboutdismantlingtheinstitutionsoftheeuro".
This advice sounds quite reasonable, yet it was badly received, judgingfromtheresponseitevoked.Jean-ClaudeJuncker,president of the Eurogroup finance ministers, said that European officials did not care to have detailed discussions about expanding their bailout fund "with a nonmember of the euro area". Didier Reynders, the Belgian finance minister, said that Mr. Geithner should listen rather thantalk.Finally,MariaFekter,financeministerofAustria,"foundit peculiar that, even though the Americans have significantly worse fundamental data than the euro zone, they tell us what we should do".
It may be true that Europe's fundamentals are not too bad. In Mr. Trichet's words (Trichet was the Governor of ECB until January 1, 2012)"iftheeurozonewereasinglecountry,itwouldactuallylook like a model economy, with a small current account surplus, a primary budget deficit of less than half that of the UK and the US, subduedhouseholddebt,lowinflationandalittlegrowth".Moreover, its consolidated debt falls short of the US and Japanese ones. But to disregardthepresentvulnerabilityoftheeuroandthethreatitposes totheworldeconomy,andtheAmericanoneinparticular,wouldbe inexcusablycomplacent. ThestateofpublicconfidenceintheAmericaneconomyisextremely lowandthisbodesillforitsgrowthprospects.AsYale'sProf.Robert Shillerhasnoted,theexpectationsoftheAmericanpublicofhowwell the country will be doing over the next five years are at the lowest ebbinthirtyyears. xiv SovereigndebtdefaultsinEuropeand,evenmoreso,acollapseofthe eurozonewillaffecttheAmericanandindeedtheworldeconomynot onlythroughtheireffectonthestateofconfidencebutalso,andmore immediately, through the financial linkages of an ever more interdependent and intertwined global economic system. It is, therefore,notsurprisingthattheAmericangovernmentisconcerned aboutEurope'ssovereigndebtproblem.Thefactthatthecountryis sooninanelectoralyearaddsurgencyandenhancesthisconcern.
TheaboveexplanationoftheUSgovernment'sconcernforEurope's financial stability may be contested by those holding the not uncommon view, that Europe has an antagonistic relationship with the US in international finance. Consequently, it may be argued, America'sfundamentalinterestisinunderminingratherthansaving the euro. This view may, at first sight, seem plausible but does not holdwater,atleastunderthepresentcircumstances.
It is true that the existence of the euro and its expanding role as a mediumofinternationalpaymentsmakesitaninternationalreserve currency in competition with the American dollar. This clearly reduces the seigniorage gain and restricts the margin of maneuver that the US possesses in running current account deficits without risking a fall in the dollar's exchange rate. But the relationship between the US and Europe is symbiotic rather than purely antagonistic. Asymbioticrelationshipincludesbothcompetitionandcooperation aspotentialmodes.Competitionisnotunlimitedbutbounded,giving waytocooperationwhenthereisathreattotheexistenceofeither side,whilecooperationisalwayspossibleandmayariseevenwhen gains are unequally shared between the two sides. Symbiotic relationshipsarequitecommoninnaturebutmayalsobeobserved ininternationalrelationsandeconomiclife.Despitetheemphasison competition in economic thinking, there are many instances of cooperation in economic life and a lot more for which cooperation could be a superior alternative to competition. Harvard's Prof. A. Brandenburger with Yale's Prof. B. Nalebuff, coined the term "coopetition" (in their book of the same title xv ) to describe the co-existence of competition and cooperation, as well as the alternation between the two behavioral modes, in actual business practice. Moreover, they argue convincingly that business strategies, which recognize and use the potential for cooperation, can be far superior tostrategiesresultingfromapurelycompetitivementality.
It seems quite probable that the US government views America's relationshiptoEuropeasasymbioticone.Thisinterpretationseems, atleast,tobeinaccordwiththesequenceofevents,whichfollowed theEurogroupfinanceministers'meeting.
Mr.GeithnerdidnotgiveupinthefaceofEuropeancriticism.Abouta week later, at the annual meeting of the IMF, he warned that the European debt crisis is "the most serious risk now confronting the world economy" and strongly emphasized the need for immediate actiononthepartofEuropeanleaders.Inaddition,twodayslater,US PresidentBarackObamamadeequallystrongstatementstothesame effect.Hisexactwordswerethat"They(i.e.theEuropeans)aregoing throughafinancialcrisisthatisscaringtheworld,andtheyaretrying to take responsible actions, but those actions haven't been quite as quickastheyneedtobe".Heattributedtheproblemtothefactthat theEuropeans"havenotfullyhealedfromthecrisisbackin2007and never fully dealt with all the challenges that their banking system faced.It'snowbeingcompoundedbywhat'shappeninginGreece". WhatwastheEuropeanreactiontoObamaandAmerica'ssecondcall forurgentaction?Itwasclearlynotbetterthanthefirst.TheGerman finance minister Wolfgang Schauble responded that "it's always easier to give other people advice" and "I don't think Europe's problems are America's only problems", while other German commentatorsdubbedObama'sremarks"arrogant"and"absurd". xvi Is there any rational explanation for such a rebuff of a seemingly reasonable concern by an erstwhile trusted ally and important tradingpartner?Thisiswherepridemakesanentrance.Itisdifficult to think of any reason other than irrational and misguided national prideinexplainingthisstance.
We have therefore seen pride at work; what about prejudice? For this,wemustaskthenextobviousquestionarisingfromouraccount of events. Why has it been so difficult to take action in order to safeguardtheeuroandtheEuropeanbankingsystem? Toanswerthisquestion,letusconsiderthemosteffectivesolutionto Europe'sfinancialcrisis.ThisisclearlytoremedywhatSoroscalled "the hidden weakness in the construction of the euro". A European Treasuryneedstobecreated.Thecommontreasurymustbeableto raise taxes across the euro zone, coordinate and control national fiscalpolicies,issuebondsandperformallthefunctionsrequiredofa federal state treasury, while being accountable to the European Parliament. There is no doubt that this would be a truly great step forwardinthedeepeningofEuropeanintegrationandtherealization ofafederalstate.
The second major reform that is needed concerns the role of the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB should be responsible not only for the containment of inflation but also for the proper functioning of the financial system across the euro zone, being empowered to control the banking system without constraints and operating, without inhibitions, as the lender of last resort for both financialinstitutionsandnationaltreasuries. xvii Eitherofthesetworeformscouldhavebeenasufficientresponseto thecrisis.Thetworeformsconstitutejointlythefirst-bestsolutionto Europe's financial problems. If they were adopted, not only the present crisis could immediately come to an end but also it might have served as a unique opportunity for a decisive step towards federal Europe. This would have been in the best tradition of European integration, which has tended to proceed by resolving problems caused from incomplete though politically feasible previous measures. But politicians, with their eyes firmly fixed on their electoral chances and on political alliances necessary to governmental coalitions, are not ready for such major advances at present.
Instead, all kinds of "red lines" are drawn by the main decisionmakers, according to their estimations of what is politically feasible ornon-feasible,giventheirowninterestsandtargets.Consequently, themosteffectiveresponseisruledoutandweareinevitablyinthe realm of second-best solutions. As the theory of the second-best implies, there is no clear criterion in ranking such solutions and decidingwhichissuperior,whichexplainswhyitisdifficulttoarrive at an agreed course of action. Moreover, in the present context, the "red lines" which determine the possible second-best solutions are themselves heavily dependent on the political leaders' personal courageandmotivations.And,ofcourse,prejudiceintheelectorate's mind, as well as in that of the leaders, is an important factor in drawingthe"redlines".
Prejudice against the creation of a European treasury is, of course, understandable among euro-skeptical political parties. Any move towards a common treasury clearly implies a reduction of national sovereignty, as national fiscal policy will need approval and may be subject to a possible veto by institutions at the European level. Moreover, a common treasury would have to take a view of the economic situation and needs throughout Europe and redistribute resources, most likely from the strongest to the weakest countries and regions. It is, thus, not surprising that political leaders in Germany and other economically strong countries tread cautiously withrespecttothisreform.DespitetheattemptbyMr.Trichettoput thecreationofaEuropeanFinanceMinisterontheagenda,allthatis contemplatedatpresentisstrictermonitoringofpublicfinancesand the imposition of sanctions if agreed plans are violated. This on its ownisclearlyinsufficientasaresponsetothecrisis.
Prejudice against expanding the power and responsibilities of the European Central Bank(ECB) is more difficult to understand. This "red line" is based on the German fear that by allowing the ECB to directly lend to governments, the euro will be debased and hyperinflation will follow, as happened to the Weimar Republic's markinthe1920s.Butcentralbanksallovertheworldlendtotheir governments without causing hyperinflation. The remote possibility of huge mismanagement sometime in the future does not justify takingtodaytheextremeriskofafinancialmeltdown,thatcaneasily be averted by an adequately empowered central bank. As Prof. WillemBuiter,Citigroup'schiefeconomistandformerboardmember of the Bank of England, has noted: "The blanket prohibition against directlylendingtogovernmentsisacompleteidiocy…Justbecauseit canbemismanageddoesnotmeanyouhavetothrowthetoolaway. Youcandrowninwaterbutitdoesnotmeanyoucannothaveaglass whenyouarethirsty". xviii
The"redline"drawnbyMrs.Merkel,whenshedeclaredlastOctober to the German parliament "all models that depend on ECB participationareoffthetable",seemstobeacaseofunfounded,pure prejudice.
6)Whatisthepresentstateoftheeurocrisis?
OnthesamedaythatMrs.MerkelproscribedanywideninginECB's role, she also affirmed that "Germany, regardless of political party, willprotecttheworkofEuropeanunity".Asitprogressivelybecame clear, in the course of the past year, that European unity was threatened from the possible collapse of the Spanish and Italian publicfinances,Mrs.Merkelfortunatelychangedhermindaboutthe roleoftheECB.IntheJuneSummit,sheagreed,althoughseemingly reluctantly, to a banking union under the supervision of the ECB. Following its establishment, direct aid by the ESM to banks and not only to states was then to become possible. This is of great importancebecausetherescuingofanyvulnerablebankinacountry wouldnotanymoreinvolveanincreaseinthecountry'sdebtanda worsening of its debt to GDP ratio. Consequently, the vicious circle betweenthebankingcrisisandthesovereigndebtcrisisisbroken.
This did not prove enough to calm the financial markets because, apartfromvaguenessregardinganumberofpracticaldetails,itcould not be put into effect before the end of the year at the earliest. Consequently,Mr.MarioDraghi,successorofMr.Trichettothehelm of the ECB, had to announce at the end of July that the ECB will do whateverisneededtopreservetheeuro. xix But the real turning point came on September 6. Mario Draghi launched an unlimited bond-buying program by the ECB (named Outright Monetary Transactions), which would provide a "fully effectivebackstoptoavoiddestructivescenarios…intheeuroarea". DespitestrongobjectionsbyBundesbankPresidentJensWeidmann, Mrs. Merkel evidently sided with Draghi. As a result, the euro crisis has now abated and risk premia on Spanish and Italian bonds have receded. xx It is worth noting that the unlimited buying of a country's bonds is notunconditional.Theconditionisthatthecountrymustfirstaskfor EMS assistance and must accept to implement agreed structural reforms under the supervision of the troika. But just the announcement that any country in extremis would be saved by the ECBinthismanner,wassufficienttoremovetheriskofbonddefault, lowerbondyieldsand,thus,reduceacountry'sborrowingcost.
Finally, another recent development has had a positive impact. The calmingofthebondmarketshasbeenfurtherabettedbythedecision of Germany's Constitutional Court on September 12 to dismiss a complaintagainsttheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(ESM).
So,istheeurocrisisover?

7)WhatarethefutureprospectsforEurope?
It has been argued above, that the root cause of the crisis is the absence of a common treasury. As long as this is missing, the euro crisiswillnotdisappear;itwillonlychangeform.Insteadofsurfacing asasovereigndebtandbankingcrisis,itwillinthefutureappearasa North-Southcompetitivenessandgrowthdiscrepancycrisis.
Ifacommontreasuryissuingeurobondsforalleurozonecountriesis not instituted, the borrowing costs of creditor and debtor countries willcontinuetodiverge.Thisdivergencewillnotbeaswideasatthe heightoftheeurocrisisbutitmaystillbesubstantial.Thishandicap forthedebtorcountrieswillmakeitmoredifficultforthemtoreduce their debt to GDP ratios and will require larger primary budget surpluses. As a result, they are more likely to be stuck in recession and to have lower growth rates than the creditor countries. Moreover,theirfirmswillalsohavehigherborrowingcosts(because of the country risk) than those in creditor countries and will find it moredifficulttocompete.
Giventhislackofalevelplayingfield,itisprobablethatEuropewill bedividedonthebasisofdifferentialgrowthrates,withthenorthern creditor countries enjoying higher growth rates than the southern debtor ones. This will inevitably create tensions between the two groups of countries and will be damaging to European solidarity in thelongerrun.
Isthereanotherwayforward?ItverymuchdependsonGermany.If Germanyoptsfortheestablishmentofacommontreasuryandfora monetary policy that takes into account the need for growth of the southerndebtoreconomies,theeurocrisiswillbefullyresolved.But howlikelyisthis?
Toanswerthis,itmaybeworthwhiletolookbrieflyatthehistorical trajectory of Europe's progress so far. The process of European integrationhasbeenalwaysopen-ended.Twomainorientationsare discernible from early on. These may be dubbed "British" and "German" after the biggest countries, which most unfailingly have espoused them. The "British" orientation is towards a European common market while the "German" one is towards a European federalstate.
The implications of these two views of European integration with respect to national sovereignty are clearly quite different. The first impliescedingtheminimumofnationalsovereigntythatisnecessary for the operation of the common market while the second requires the abandonment of national sovereignty for the realization of the federalstate.
Germany used to assert that it had no independent foreign policy, only a European one. But the German public seems at present unwillingtomakeconcessionsforthesakeoffederalEurope.Ithas made sacrifices for the cause of German reunification and then for increasing Germany's competitiveness following the adoption of the euro.
Today,aftermorethantwodecadesofausterity,itisinnomoodfora "transfer union" that will reward the spendthrift southerners for their profligate ways, which is how the common treasury will be portrayed by its opponents. Moreover, the German public deeply distrustsamonetarypolicy,whichpushesuptherateofinflationin Germany.Consequently,giventheseprejudices,itisunlikelythatthe policy,whichcanfullyresolvetheeurozonecrisis,willbeadopted. xxi
8)WhatisGreece'sfuture?
Time is running out for Greece. The policy of "internal devaluation" throughfiscalcontractioniscausingalotofpain.Thisisthefifthyear that the economy is in recession, with GDP this year falling by 7% and the cumulative GDP reduction exceeding 20%. The income of civil servants and pensioners has been reduced by more than a quarter.Intheprivatesector,alotofbusinesseshavefoldedupand unemployment has shot up to nearly 25 percent of the labor force and over 50 percent among the young. What is possibly worse, investmentprospectsarebleakandthereseemstobenoendinsight ofthisdownwardtrajectory.
In addition, national pride is deeply hurt and prejudice, especially against Germany, is rife. Greeks are particularly resentful about accusations in the German press that they are lazy and live at the expense of the German taxpayers. This, by the way, is completely unfoundedasthelatestOECDstatisticsdemonstrate:Greeksworkin fact longer than most Europeans including the Germans. Moreover, they resent being used as scapegoats for the faulty design of the eurozone,forwhichGermanyislargelyresponsible.
Hurt national pride tends to breed prejudice. Old memories of atrocitiesbytheGermanoccupationarmy,thehugelossinlivesand the destruction inflicted to the country during the occupation, are revivedandexacerbated.GermansareseenasNaziswhoaretrying again to subjugate Greece (and eventually the rest of Europe), only this time using economic instead of military power. In addition, the issueofwarreparations,whichhasneverbeendealtwithtoGreece's satisfaction, inflames passions against Germany that has never paid itsowndebt.
The mixture of serious economic hardship and disillusionment, togetherwithhurtprideandprejudice,leadstopoliticalpolarization and a strengthening of the extremes, both left and right. The heightenedsocialtensionscaneasilyleadtopoliticalupheavalswith catastrophic consequences for Greece's future. In these circumstances, Prof. Neumann's prediction may yet come true despite Mrs. Merkel's recent visit to Athens (on 9 October), which was meant to reassure Greece of Germany's wish to avoid a Grexit andtoencourageGreekstostaythecourse.
It is widely expected that if Antonis Samaras(presently presiding over a three-party coalition government) fails, the next government will be led by the neo-communist party Syriza. Syriza has consistently opposed the Memorandum and seemed to opt for the repudiationofdebtobligationsandGreece'sexitfromtheEurozone ratherthanaccepttheconditionsdemandedbythetroika.
Nevertheless, given the unpopularity of a return to the drachma, Syrizahasmorerecentlychangeditstune.Thus,intherun-uptothe Juneelectionsandsincethen,itinsiststhatitwantsGreecetoremain intheeurozonewhile,atthesametime,redoublingitsattacksonthe governmentforbeingpliabletothewishesofthetroikaandlacking the will to renegotiate the Memorandum. In this, and possibly only this,itisinfullaccordwiththeotherthreeoppositionparties:theold CommunistParty,theIndependentGreeks,whichisasplintergroup fromtherightofNewDemocracy,andtheneo-fascistGoldenDawn, whichisrapidlyrisinginpopularity.
It is clear that the most important and urgent political issue is the negotiation with the troika and, indeed, the continued stay or exit from the eurozone. Syriza wishes to draw a number of red lines (mostlyregardingcutsinwagesandpensions,liberalizationoflabor laws and, possibly above all, redundancies in the public sector) and seemstobewillingtotaketheriskofGreecebeingpushedoutofthe eurozone.ThisinferenceisalsosupportedbythefactthatSyrizahas never declared that a Greek exit would be an unmitigated disaster andhasnotdenouncedanumberofvoicesinfavorofanexit,which comefromwithinitsownranksandsympathizers.
In all probability, a return to the drachma under Syriza would be a return to the past with a vengeance. This is because Syriza's recipe for a revival of the Greek economy is through a rise in public spending. A devaluation-inflation spiral would inevitably follow but the unholy alliance of political parties, the media and statedependentcontractorsandsuppliers,whicharepresentlyeffectively bankruptandclearlyonaretreat,wouldbegivenanewleaseoflife. Public sector employment would increase but the lack of structural competitiveness, which is the crucial problem and constitutes the major impediment to the developmental prospects of the Greek economy,wouldnotbeaddressed.
In fact, structural competitiveness (which is the ability to compete internationally without the aid of devaluation) would certainly deteriorate in the absence of labor market reforms. The cost of bureaucracy, which according to European Commission estimates, amounts to 6.8% of GDP (nearly twice the EU average), would probably get worse with the strengthening of the public sector unionsunderSyrizaandthiswouldfurtherdamagecompetitiveness. Privatization efforts of the inordinately large state property would certainlybeabandonedandthemismanagementandexploitationof stateassetsbypara-statistrings,oftenwiththecollusionofpolitical parties,wouldcontinueasinthepast.
The point is that the structural reforms contained in the Memorandum and the reforms needed not only in the labor market andthepublicadministrationbutalsointhejudiciaryand,arguably above all, in the financing and operation of the political parties, are ignored by Syriza, which rejects the Memorandum in its entirety. Syriza'smessageisthatoncewegetridoftheMemorandum,wecan reversethereductionsincivilservants'salariesandpensionsandgo back to the good old days. It is exactly the nostalgia for the recent pastthathascausedtheshiftofthestrongpublicsectortradeunions fromPASOKtoSyriza,alongwiththemostpopulistelementsofthe socialistparty'sapparatus,whichmostbenefitedfromtheexpansion of the state. The only difference from the past, according to Syriza, willbethattherichwillpaymoretaxes.
In the rather unlikely case that Syriza does not opt for an exit from the euro, the recipe does not seem to substantially vary. The government primary deficit will need to be eliminated and this will be done, by exclusively increasing tax receipts. In this case, the rich (andonlytherich)willpayalotmoretaxes.
There is no question that the rich should pay their proper share of tax. The need for better collection of taxes is beyond dispute, as tax evasion is rampant. And, of course, there is a need for an equitable andoperationallysimpletaxsystem,whichcitizensrecognizeasfair and,atthesametime,minimizestaxcollectors'corruptionanddoes notmilitateagainstenterpriseanddevelopment.Buttheproblemis notsomuchthattherichdon'tpaytaxesasthat,thosewhocanhide theirincomedonotpaytaxes.
Self-employment, especially in services, provides comparatively moreopportunitiestohideone'sincome.Thisappliesinallcountries, the more so in those lacking a highly developed sense of civic duty, while high tax rates on transactions certainly don't help. In Greece, the self-employed are the highest proportion of the labor force among all OECD countries. Also, small family-run firms with a minimal number of non-family employees constitute the vast majority of firms in the Greek economy. Moreover, trust in the government is low and, with a VAT at 23%, the buyer of a service provided by a self-employed supplier has a significant incentive not to demand a receipt. In this way, the buyer gets a discount equal to the amount of the tax and, of course, the seller does not report the transactionanddoesnotpayincometaxonit.Thisexplainshowthe average income of the self-employed, from doctors to plumbers to smallshopkeepers(andthereareproportionatelymoreofthelatter than in any OECD country), turns out to be a small fraction of the averagesalariedperson'sincome.
What can be done about this predicament? There is a great Greek successstoryintheinternationaleconomicarena,whichprovidesa cuetowhatshouldbedone.Thisisinternationalshipping,inwhich Greeceleadstheworld.Greecehasmanagedthisbyhavingasimple and stable (because it is enshrined in the Constitution) tonnage tax on ships. The amount of the due tax is reliably and unambiguously known at an instant; there is no need for detailed bookkeeping and taxaccounting;notaxinspectorsandcorruption;nobureaucracyand meddling by the state; no grounds for political clientelism and patronage; no obstacles to enterprise and development. This tax regimeobviouslygoesagainstthegrainofthepoliticalelite'sstatist disposition and was reluctantly established not so much because of shipping's undoubtedly important contribution to the economy but becausetheship-ownershad(andalwayshave)theoptiontoeasily move their seat of operations elsewhere. Consequently, not only it would be futile and counter-productive to tax ship-owners' income ratherthanshiptonnage,astheleftwishes,butonthecontrarythis typeoftaxcouldbeused,withequallybeneficialeffects,tosolvethe problemoftaxingthosewhocanhidetheirincome.
A similar kind of tax, based on simple, unambiguous and readily obtainable indices of indispensable inputs to the various goods and services provided by self-employed persons and very small firms, shouldnotbeimpossibletodesign,giventhepoliticalwilltodoso.A simpler alternative would be the imputation of a minimum income, whichisconsiderednecessaryfortheprovisionofthevariousgoods andservices,takingintoaccountthelocalcostofliving.Itshouldbe notedthatataxsystembasedonimputedvalueshasbeenappliedin thepast,thelasttimeabouttwentyyearsagofromthelastcoalition governmentledbyatechnocrat.Itdidnotlastlong,giventheoutcry fromtheself-employedandsmallbusiness,ontheonehand,andthe finance ministry and tax accountants, on the other. Thus, the allegedly"antiquated"tax,whichwas"notfitforamodernstate",was abolished allowing the self-employed to pay practically no tax and thetaxprofession,bothstateandprivate,tothrive.
Inconclusion,theonlyhopeforGreece'sfutureisthattwoconditions actually materialize, the first of which is beyond Greece's control. This is that Europe carries out swiftly the required reforms, establishingacommontreasuryandadoptingappropriatefiscaland monetarypoliciesforgrowth.Secondly,asregardsactionbyGreece, thestructuralreformsagreedwiththetroikashouldbeimplemented withoutfurtherdelay and,mostimportantly,thepublicsectormust undergo a radical overhaul, so as to reduce its size, minimize bureaucracy and promote private enterprise. This is the exact opposite of the Syriza program. The one thing about which Syriza seems to be right is that debt repayment will probably need to be renegotiated(butonlyfollowingtherealizationofstructuralreforms andtherestorationofcompetitiveness)and,preferably,linkedtothe performanceoftheGreekeconomy. vii See,SatyajitDas""TheRoadtoNowhere"-Europe'sDebtCrisis", Eurointelligence,January9,2012. viii ThisseemstobeProfessorNeumann'sview.Astrictenforcement of the fiscal rules is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the resolution of the debt crisis. If Greece cannot restore fiscal balance, it will be shown the exit from the euro zone. Thetemporaryshocktotheeconomywillbemanageableand,inthe long run, the euro zone will rest on a more stable foundation. Imbalancesinproductivityandgrowthamongmemberstatescannot be precluded but they will lead to labor flows from weak to strong economiesratherthanresourcetransfersfromstrongtoweakones. ix The fiscal compact has been criticized for its fuzziness and, especially,theabsenceofanobjectivecriterionforaction.Automatic correction is to be effected "in the event of significant(?) observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it" unless exceptional(?) circumstances, which are not furtherspecified,happentoprevail.Ithasbeennotedthatbymaking astate'sstructuralfiscaldeficitthemainoperationalcriterion,itputs "anunmeasurableconceptintothelaw".See,MartinWolf"Thepain inSpainwilltesttheeuro",FinancialTimes,March7,2012. x Jean Monnet was the key early architect of Europe. Monnet said: "We are not forming coalitions of states, we are uniting men" on a marchtogethertowardacommonEuropeandestiny. xi Lawrence Summers "Five grim and essential lessons for world leaders", Financial Times, November 2, 2011. Summers' five lessons have been condensed, for economy, to the most important three lessonsthatarepresentedhere.TheworldleadersaretheGroupof 20,whoweremeetinginCannesatthetime. xii It is clear that, if this is true, it has important implications for the interpretation and writing of history. The rationality of the main actors cannot be taken for granted and may not guide all their actions. This means that the rational interest of the actors or "the logicofthesituation"maynotsufficetoexplaintheactors'behavior at possibly crucial historical junctures. Consequently, the psychological state and motivations of the protagonists needs to be understood and taken into account, in order to accurately reconstruct historical events. But the further away in time we are fromtheeventtobeexplained,themoredifficultitbecomestohave reliableinformationregardingthepsychologicalsetupoftherelevant actors. As a result, the common notion that older events can be explainedbetterthanrecentones,seemstobecontradicted.
Endnotes
There seem to be two reasons for the usual position that historical accountsofoldereventsaremorereliablethanthoseofmorerecent ones, both of which relate to rationality. Firstly, there is a presuppositionthatthereislesspassionandirrationalfeelingsabout eventsfurtherinthepast,allowingamorerationalassessmentofthe actors'actions.Thesecondpresupposition underlyingthisorthodox viewisthatallconsequencesofoldereventshavebeenrealizedand becomeapparent.Thenhistorycanbeinterpretedastheoutcomeof rational (maybe even super-rational) actors who intended these consequences.
xiii Pride and especially prejudice as exhibited in the chauvinist stereotypes, such as "Greeks are lazy or liars" and "Germans are arrogantorautocratic",areclearlydangerousandcanquiteevidently undermineEuropeansolidarityifleftunchecked.Here,thereference istotheirlessobviousroleinclingingondubiouseconomicdoctrines andtheshapingofeconomicpolicy.
xiv Robert J. Shiller "The Great Debt Scare", Project Syndicate, September23,2011.Therelevantindex,fromtheThomson-Reuters UniversityofMichiganSurveysofConsumers,whichreached135-its highest-ever point in 2000, had dropped to 88 in May 2011 and in only 4 months it further fell to 48 in September, following the months-longdeadlockovertheUSgovernment'sdebtceilingandthe stories about imminent sovereign debt default in Greece and other Europeanstates.
be solved by the ECB providing a one-off guarantee for a minimum priceofthethreatenedsovereignbonds. xix Mario Draghi had attempted earlier this year to stabilize the situation by lending one billion euros for three years to European banks. Nevertheless, this indirect policy had three undesirable consequenceswhencomparedwithadirectECBintervention.First,it created more liquidity than was required because only a fraction of this liquidity was channeled into government bonds by the banks. Second, banks may sell off these bonds (especially if austerityinduced recession exacerbates the peripheral countries' fiscal problems) causing a new panic. Third, the easy profits provided to the banks, reduces their incentives to restructure their balance sheets.Themoralhazardriskisgreaterforbanksthanitwouldhave beenforstates(inthecaseofdirectintervention)becausetherecent fiscal pact gives to the European Commission considerable control over state budgets. See, Paul De Grauwe "Direct ECB intervention is stilltheonlywaytoendthecrisis"FinancialTimes,March13,2012. Moreover, it should be noted that even this indirect policy is disagreeable to Germany. Jens Weidmann in a leaked letter to the press has expressed concern about the dangers created by the ECB policy of increasing liquidity, while Jurgen Stark (a former ECB executive board member) has told a German newspaper that ECB's balancesheet"isn'tjustgiganticinsizebutalsoshockinginquality". See, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard "Germany's monetary doyen slams ECB's"shocking"balancesheet",DailyTelegraph.March8,2012. xx ThepredictionbyProf.Wyploszcannotbestrictlytestedanymore but Wyplosz seems to have been vindicated, since the ECB presumablychangeditspositionexactlyinordertoavoidacollapse oftheeuro. xxi George Soros argues that if Germany will not lead Europe by adopting this required policy, then the only other (though inferior) alternative to continued recession for the South and eventual dissolution of the EU, is for Germany to leave the eurozone. As it is epigrammatically put, "Germany should lead or leave". See, George Soros"ThetragedyoftheEuropeanUnionandhowtoresolveit"The NewYorkReviewofBooks, September27,2012. 
